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DIGITAL MEDICATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR USE IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Jennifer Onka*
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 13, 2017, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved the first drug in the United States with a digital ingestion
tracking system.1
The tracking system incorporates several
components. First, an aripiprazole tablet, an atypical antipsychotic2
used to treat schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and other mental
illnesses, is embedded with an ingestible event marker sensor.3 When
the pill is ingested and comes into “contact with digestive fluid, the
digital tablet dissolves and activates.”4 Upon activation, the sensor
emits a time-stamped signal, which is detected by an adhesive sensor
patch, approximately 10 cm long, that is worn on the patient’s torso.5
Data from the sensor patch is then transmitted and stored in a
Bluetooth-enabled device.6 If the patient so chooses, the data can be
uploaded to a cloud-based, encrypted, HIPAA-compliant record, which
can be shared with the patient’s physician and caregivers.7 The
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1 FDA Approves Pill with Sensor That Digitally Tracks if Patients Have Ingested Their
Medication, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 13, 2017) [hereinafter Press Release, FDA],
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-pill-sensordigitally-tracks-if-patients-have-ingested-their-medication.
2 Aripiprazole (Abilify), NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.nami.org/LearnMore/Treatment/Mental-Health-Medications/aripiprazole-(Abilify) (last visited Mar.
3, 2021).
3 Preetika Rana, Digital Pills That Talk to Your Doctor Are Here, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13,
2017, 11:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fda-approves-worlds-first-digitaldrug-1510621146.
4 Dr. Tina Caliendo & Dr. Olga Hilas, The Promise and Pitfalls of Digital Medication,
U.S. PHARMACIST (July 18, 2019), https://www.uspharmacist.com/article/the-promiseand-pitfalls-of-digital-medication.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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captured data includes not only information regarding the date and time
of ingestion, but also “physiological metrics such as physical activity,
heart rate, skin temperature, and sleep.”8 The patient can also choose to
self-report data such as mood and quality of sleep.9
The impetus behind the digital pill was to improve patient
adherence and to allow physicians to provide more effective and
collaborative care through increased transparency.10 Many in the health
care community, including the Director of the Division of Psychiatry
Products in the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
recognize the value of a system that tracks medication adherence in
some patients with mental illness,11 a segment of the medical
community with notoriously low rates of non-adherence.12 Other
commentators, however, have proven to be more skeptical of this new
technology,13 believing the digital pill portends an age of “biomedical big
brother,”14 one in which insurance companies will leverage the
technology to strong-arm compliance and potential data breaches
threaten patient privacy.15
Another line of critique focuses on the potential use of the digital
pill in the criminal justice sphere. Advocates for the mental health
community fear the ethical and constitutional quandaries of monitoring
a segment of the population “already disproportionately subjected to

8

Id.
What Is the ABILIFY MYCITE System?, ABILIFY MYCITE [hereinafter Product
Information], https://www.abilifymycite.com/about (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
10 Brian Dolan, Proteus Biomedical Tweaks Branding, Partners with Abilify-Maker
Otsuka, MOBI HEALTH NEWS (July 6, 2012, 3:55 AM), https://www.mobihealthnews.com/
17831/proteus-biomedical-tweaks-branding-partners-with-abilify-maker-otsuka.
11 Press Release, FDA, supra note 1.
12 Non-adherence to medication regimes is endemic to the treatment of both
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Studies have shown that as much as 75 percent of
schizophrenic patients will stop taking their medications within 18 months of
treatment, and more than 90 percent will miss doses on a regular basis. E. Brown & R.
Gray, Tackling Medication Non-Adherence in Severe Mental Illness: Where Are We Going
Wrong?, 22 J. PSYCHIATRIC & MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 192, 192–93 (2015). Similar rates of
non-adherence are documented among patients with bipolar disorder. F. Colom et al.,
Identifying and Improving Non-Adherence in Bipolar Disorders, 7 BIPOLAR DISORDERS 24,
24 (2005).
13 See generally Cat Wise, This Digital Pill Wants to Make Following Your Prescription
Easier, PBS (May 23, 2018, 5:31 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/
following-a-prescription-is-hard-this-digital-pill-wants-to-help.
14 Pam Belluck, First Digital Pill Approved to Worries About Biomedical ‘Big Brother,’
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/health/digital-pillfda.html.
15 Concerns regarding use of the digital pill by insurance companies and privacy
considerations are beyond the scope of this Comment.
9
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coercion and surveillance.”16 Others fear disproportionate misuse of the
technology by judges and probation officers, who stand at the ready to
send an offender back to prison for any deviation from his medication
regime.17
This Comment will take the opposite position, arguing that use of
the digital pill in our criminal justice system for certain offenders who
have a history of either self-injurious or violent behavior when not
medicated, coupled with a track record of medication non-adherence, is
both constitutional and advisable as a matter of public policy. A special
condition of supervised release18 that requires this small segment of
seriously mentally ill offenders to take digital medication and to share
the captured data with their probation officers would provide
supervision and accountability to those who could benefit from such
oversight and would prove valuable to the health care and prison
systems, as well as the community at large.
Part II will analogize the digital pill to other utilized forms of
enhanced post-release supervision such as forceable medication via
long-acting injectable antipsychotics and monitoring devices, such as
electronic location monitors or the secure continuous remote alcohol
monitor, to make the argument that the imposition of digital medication
as a term of supervised release passes constitutional muster.
Part III will first discuss the alarming rates of incarceration of
seriously mentally ill offenders and the difficulties correctional
institutions face in caring for this population.19 In light of these realities,
Part III will then address why digital medication, for the right patient
and in conjunction with other terms of supervised release providing
treatment and support services, reflects good policy that would alleviate
some of the strain placed on both our criminal justice and mental health
systems, in addition to being beneficial to the patient himself. Part III
16

David M. Perry, Your Pills Are Spying on You, PACIFIC STANDARD (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://psmag.com/social-justice/the-pills-have-eyes.
17 Wise, supra note 13.
18 Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, supervised release took the place
of parole for federal crimes committed after November 1, 1987. See P.L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1987; see also Charles Doyle, Supervised Release (Parole): An Overview of Federal
Law, CONG. RES. SERV. (Mar. 5, 2015), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/
RL31653. While there are marked differences between the two, both supervised release
and parole represent terms of restricted freedom following a period of incarceration. Id.
Additionally, revocation of either parole or supervised release could potentially mean a
return to prison. Id. Therefore, for purposes of this Comment, it is a non-substantive
distinction, and any references to parole in the articles or case law cited herein should
be considered to apply equally to the system of supervised release.
19 Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARV. C.
R.-C. L. L. REV. 391, 391 (2006).
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will, hopefully, help assuage some of the worst fears of mental health
advocates by arguing that both constitutional constraints and the
limitations of the technology itself will help ensure that the use of digital
medication is both constrained and flexible.
It must be stressed that while this Comment argues that enhanced
supervision through digital medication for a small segment of mentally
ill offenders is one way to potentially improve recidivism rates for
mentally ill offenders, thereby helping to improve overall conditions in
penal institutions, this Comment does not suggest that this potential tool
should be used in isolation. There are many other methods by which to
improve prison conditions, such as decreasing overall rates of
incarceration, increasing the number of mental hospital beds, and
financing more robust community outreach programs for persons
suffering from mental illness both prior to, and upon release from,
incarceration. By no means should digital medication be seen as a
substitute for these much-needed reforms to our criminal justice and
mental health care systems, but rather, as one tool to increase
transparency for a select number of offenders who would benefit from
closer supervision.
Finally, Part IV will briefly discuss two other areas where the
criminal justice system could potentially leverage this technology. First,
this Comment will discuss the potential use of digital medication as a
discretionary condition of probation and explore how the legal and
policy implications of such a condition are both analogous to, and
divergent from, a condition of supervised release. Second, this
Comment will touch upon the potential for such technology to expand
into the treatment of opioid addiction.
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE20
Digital medication is unique in that it encompasses both a
medication and monitoring component.21 Because of the novelty of
digital medication, this Comment will break down its components, first
discussing the legal standard surrounding special conditions of
supervised release that compel an offender to take certain medications,
and then addressing the standard around monitoring devices. First,
however, this Comment will discuss 18 U.S.C. § 3583, the federal statute
that addresses terms of supervised release after imprisonment.

20 This Comment will look solely at the federal statutory and constitutional
standards governing special conditions of supervised release.
21 See supra Part I.
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When sentencing a defendant to a term of imprisonment for either
a felony or misdemeanor, a district court may require that the defendant
be “placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment.”22 When
the sentence of imprisonment exceeds one year, or if the statute so
provides, a term of supervised release is compulsory.23 Moreover,
certain conditions, such as drug testing and registration of convicted sex
offenders, must be imposed with every term of supervised release.24 In
addition to these mandatory conditions, district courts have discretion
to impose any appropriate condition of supervised release provided
that the condition is reasonably related to the following factors: (1) the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;25 (2) the desire to adequately deter
criminal conduct; (3) the need to protect the public from future crime;
and (4) the aim of providing the defendant with “education or vocation
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner.”26 Additionally, the condition must involve no greater
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the
aforementioned purposes.27 Finally, the condition must be “consistent
with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a).”28
District courts are afforded wide latitude in crafting conditions of
supervised release, which are only reviewed for abuse of discretion
upon appeal.29 Special conditions mandating that offenders comply
with various treatment programs are not anomalous.30 Rather, the
Sentencing Guidelines specifically identify “Mental Health Program
Participation” as a special condition of supervised release that may be
appropriate if there is evidence that the defendant is in need of
22

18 U.S.C. § 3583(a).
18 U.S.C. app. § 5D1.1.
24 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
25 Id. § 3553(a)(1).
26 Id. § 3553(a)(2).
27 Id. § 3583(d)(2).
28 Id. § 3583(d)(3).
29 United States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 259–60 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing United States
v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999)); United States v. Bee, 162 F.3d 1232, 1234
(9th Cir. 1998) (stating that district courts have “broad discretion” when imposing
terms of supervised release, even when it comes to “restrictions that infringe on
fundamental rights”).
30 See, e.g., United States v. Conelly, 451 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming
special condition mandating that defendant “attend, complete, and pay for mental health
services as directed by the probation officer”); United States v. Barajas, 331 F.3d 1141,
1143–46 (10th Cir. 2003) (mandating that the offender participate in an approved
mental health program); Dotson, 324 F.3d at 261 (requiring offender submit to penile
plethysmograph testing).
23
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psychiatric treatment.31 While the Sentencing Guidelines are silent as to
whether “Mental Health Program Participation” may include a mandate
that the offender take all prescribed medications, numerous courts have
seen this as a logical extension of the rationale underlying this special
condition and have approved these types of mandates.32 Special
conditions that require an offender to submit to electronic monitoring
are commonplace33 and are listed in the Sentencing Guidelines as special
conditions that may be imposed in appropriate cases.34
While 18 U.S.C. § 3583 plays into the analysis of whether digital
medication may be imposed as a special condition of supervised release,
this Comment will primarily focus on potential constitutional
challenges. There are three reasons for this. First, the vast majority of
our nation’s incarcerated people are held in state prisons and jails.35
Therefore, by concentrating on the constitutional standards, this
Comment will identify the overarching limits of this technology, which
apply to all federal and state correctional institutions, without wading
through myriad state statutory schemes that will add a layer of analysis.
Second, from a practical perspective, many of the same factors are
pertinent to both a statutory and constitutional review. And third, as
will be seen in the discussion of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Holman, if a term of supervised release passes the more
demanding constitutional inquiry, it will often pass statutory scrutiny as
well. For these reasons, as will be argued infra, the statutory analysis is
largely subsumed by the constitutional one, at least in the federal
context.

31

18 U.S.C. app. § 5D1.3(d)(5).
See, e.g., United States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Larson, No. 09-1465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23704, at *6 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 2010). See
generally United States v. Caluori, No. 16-354, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218650 (M.D.N.C
Mar. 24, 2017), aff’d, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 4103 (4th Cir. Feb. 21, 2018).
33 See, e.g., Pollard v. United States Parole Comm’n, No. 16-2918-pr, 2017 U.S App.
LEXIS 9004, at *11–13 (2d Cir. May 24, 2017) (affirming special conditions subjecting
offender to both GPS and computer monitoring); United States v. Miller, No. 12-50238,
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 11837, at *337–38 (5th Cir. June 12, 2013) (holding that special
condition subjecting defendant to active Global Positioning System (GPS) Monitoring
was appropriate given the defendant’s propensity for “angry outbursts” and “erratic
behavior” that potentially posed a threat to the public).
34 18 U.S.C. app. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C) (special condition for sex offenses requiring
defendant to participate in program for monitoring of sex offenders); 18 U.S.C. app.
§ 5D1.3(e)(5) (allowing for use of electronic monitoring to confirm defendant’s
compliance with curfew).
35 See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie
2019.html.
32
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A. Potential Constitutional Challenges to Involuntary Medication
The Supreme Court has recognized that prisoners and pretrial
detainees possess a “significant liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process
Clause.”36 The origins of this liberty interest can be traced back to a
long-standing common law rule of torts that any unauthorized touching
by a physician constitute a battery.37
The state is required to show an “essential or overriding
[governmental] interest” before depriving an individual of such a
fundamental liberty interest.38 In Washington v. Harper, the Court found
that the state’s interest in administering medication was “legitimate”
and “important.”39 And it went on to hold that the Due Process Clause
permits the state to treat a seriously mentally ill inmate with medication
against his will if the inmate is “dangerous to himself or others and the
treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”40 Thus, the inmate’s valid
liberty interest yields to the state’s interest in providing appropriate
medical care upon a showing of an “overriding justification and a
determination of medical appropriateness.”41 The test the court applies
in determining whether such overriding justification and medical
appropriateness exist is dependent on the state’s interest.42 If the
involuntary medication order is sought out of concern that the prisoner
poses a danger to himself or others, the test is whether the medication
is “medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives,
essential for the sake of [the prisoner’s] own safety or the safety of
others.”43 If the government is seeking such an order to restore a
mentally ill defendant’s competency for trial, the court must apply the
slightly more onerous test delineated in Sell v. United States.44
The Court in Sell held that for the state to forcibly medicate a
mentally ill pretrial detainee for purposes of restoring competency for
trial, the court must conclude (1) that there are important government
interests at stake, (2) that involuntary medication will significantly
further those state interests, (3) that involuntary medication is

36

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990).
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 294, n.4 (1982).
38 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003) (quoting Washington, 494 U.S.
at 225, 277).
39 Id. at 178.
40 Id.
41 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
42 United States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 288–90 (4th Cir. 2008).
43 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
44 Holman, 532 F.3d at 289.
37
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necessary to further those interests, and (4) that administration of the
drugs is medically appropriate.45
The two lines of inquiry consider many of the same factors. The
Court, however, has noted that the analysis performed when there is an
allegation of danger is both more “objective” and “manageable.”46 This
is because the reviewing court does not have to analyze the added layer
of “quintessentially legal questions of trial fairness and competence” nor
weigh such considerations against the competing state interest.47
It is unclear which test is applicable when reviewing special
conditions of supervised release. The Court in Washington noted that
the state’s interest in ensuring that the offender was not a danger to
himself or others was even more significant in a prison setting because
prison officials are responsible for running an orderly institution and
ensuring the safety of prisoners and staff.48 Thus, an important factual
consideration that the Court afforded considerable weight does not exist
when analyzing conditions of supervised release. Even more disparate
is the Sell scenario, which must also account for possible side effects of
the medication that could interfere with the defendant’s ability to assist
counsel in his defense.49
In United States v. Holman, the Fourth Circuit was confronted with
the question of which test to apply when examining a special condition
of supervised release requiring that a mentally ill defendant submit to
intramuscular injections of an antipsychotic.50 While acknowledging
that the “showing necessary to satisfy” the requirements of overriding
justification and medical appropriateness is dependent on the “context
and reasons underlying the order,”51 the Fourth Circuit ultimately
created a hybrid of the two lines of inquiry, referring to it as the “HarperRiggins-Sell constitutional analysis.”52 While referring to it as an
amalgamation, the court used the express language from the Sell test,
suggesting that, at least in the Fourth Circuit, the four-part Sell test is the
preferred mode of inquiry when analyzing the constitutionality of
special conditions of supervised release that implicate a fundamental

45

Sell, 539 U.S. at 180–81.
Id. at 183.
47 Id. at 182.
48 Washington, 494 U.S. at 225 (noting the state’s legitimate and important interest
in “combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others . . . in a prison
environment”).
49 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
50 United States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 286 (4th Cir. 2008).
51 Id. at 289.
52 Id. at 290.
46
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liberty interest.53 But other courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, eschew the
rigidity of the Sell test, instead focusing the constitutional inquiry on
whether there has been a “finding of overriding justification and a
determination of medical appropriateness.”54
The question remains whether this constitutional analysis
“supplants or supplements the statutory requirements set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d).”55 When confronted with a constitutional challenge to
a special condition of supervised release, some circuits have declined to
perform a separate constitutional inquiry, holding that “a court will not
strike down conditions of release, even if they implicate fundamental
rights, if such conditions are reasonably related to the ends of
rehabilitation and protection of the public from recidivism.”56 In both
United States v. Schave and United States v. Ritter, the defendant
challenged a special condition of supervised release as violative of his
First Amendment freedom of association.57 While both the Schave and
Ritter courts maintained that the central inquiry was whether the
condition furthered the ends delineated in the statute and proceeded to
analyze the condition using the statutory framework and terminology,
both courts ultimately addressed the constitutional challenges brought
by the defendant.58 This suggests that, at least in the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits, the constitutional inquiry supplements an analysis under 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d).

53 Id. at 290–91 (finding that (1) the government’s interest in protecting Holman
from himself and the general public are “essential or overriding interests,” (2) the
special condition “significantly furthers and is clearly necessary” to further this interest,
and (3) that the special condition is medically appropriate, given Holman’s lengthy
history of medication non-adherence); see also United States v. Caluori, No. 16-354,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218650 (M.D.N.C Mar. 24, 2017), at *32–35 (M.D.N.C. 2017)
(imposing a condition of supervised release requiring Caluori take antipsychotic
medication after finding (1) the defendant posed a substantial risk to the public, (2)
antipsychotics were necessary to control Caluori’s symptoms, and (3) such a
requirement is medically appropriate).
54 United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992)).
55 Holman, 532 F.3d at 290.
56 United States v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 1999); see also United States
v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 505 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that “even though supervised release
restrictions may affect constitutional rights such as First Amendment protections, most
restrictions are valid if directly related to advancing the individual’s rehabilitation and
to protecting the public from recidivism” before reviewing the challenged special
condition using the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) factors).
57 Schave, 186 F.3d at 840–41; Ritter, 118 F.3d at 504.
58 Schave, 186 F.3d at 843 (adopting a narrow construction of special condition to
avoid any “potential constitutional difficulties”); Ritter, 118 F.3d at 506 (finding that
condition “intrudes minimally” upon defendant’s constitutional rights).
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Conversely, in United States v. Myers, the Second Circuit held that
when a special condition implicates “a fundamental liberty interest
protected by due process,” the court’s “application of the § 3583(d)
factors must reflect the heightened constitutional concerns.”59
Accordingly, the condition will only be upheld “if the deprivation [of
liberty] is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest.”60 Thus, the Second Circuit sets a much higher bar than the
“reasonably related” standard set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583, suggesting
that the statute should be interpreted to permit whatever passes
constitutional scrutiny. It should be noted that in Myers, the court was
considering a substantive due process challenge, rather than one
brought under the First Amendment. Therefore, it would seem that
Myers’ holding that the constitutional analysis supplants the statutory
requirements would apply to any substantive due process challenge
brought to a condition mandating digital medication. Yet, in Holman, the
Fourth Circuit suggested that this circuit split concerning the interplay
between a constitutional and statutory analysis has little bearing when
it comes to special conditions mandating antipsychotic medication.61 As
the following Section demonstrates, that may, in part, be attributable to
the fact that courts ask many of the same key questions and analyze the
same factors when determining whether the condition passes both
statutory and constitutional muster.62

59 United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 125–26 (2d. Cir. 2005) (considering
constitutional challenge to a condition of supervised release that interfered with
defendant’s relationship with his constitutionally protected interest in his relationship
with his child).
60 Id.
61 United States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2008) (the court held the
special condition at issue was properly imposed when analyzed under the HarperRiggins-Sell framework and, thus, declined to weigh in on the question of whether the
constitutional analysis supplants or supplements the statutory requirements).
62 It should be noted that such a term of supervised release may also be subject to a
procedural due process challenge if the offender is not afforded notice and a hearing and
if the sentencing judge does not properly articulate on the record that the condition
“involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.” United States
v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1055–57 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the “unusually serious
infringement of liberty” attendant to special conditions requiring compliancy with
antipsychotic medications requires a higher standard of “consideration and
justification” on the record than is normally required of sentencing judges when
imposing conditions of supervised release); see also Allred v. United States, No. 2:08-CV245, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112542, at *25–26 (D.C. Utah Dec. 3, 2009) (citing Holman,
532 F.3d at 290 and United States v. Cope, 527 F.3d 944, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2008) for the
proposition that a hearing is required before imposing a term of supervised release
requiring medication compliancy).
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B. The Medication Component of the Digital Pill Passes
Constitutional Muster
Under the Harper-Riggins-Sell framework,63 propounded in
Holman, a district court considering a special condition mandating
digital medication must first determine whether there is an “essential or
overriding” government interest at stake.64 This requirement closely
mirrors 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), which requires that the condition be related
to the following government interests: (1) the desire to adequately deter
criminal conduct; and (2) the need to protect the public from future
crime.65 There is no question that protecting a mentally ill offender from
himself and protecting the general public from future crime are
essential government interests.66 Therefore, once a court decides that
medication is essential for the safety of the mentally ill offender or
others this prong of the test is satisfied.67
The court must then examine whether involuntary medication
significantly furthers and is clearly necessary to those interests.68 This
involves a highly fact-specific inquiry into the history and
characteristics of the defendant.69 It is not sufficient to speak in
generalities as to the importance of psychotropic drugs in the treatment
of schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, rather the court must inquire as to
the specific characteristics of the defendant before it.70 The court must
also consider whether there are “any alternative, less intrusive
treatments” that are likely to achieve substantially the same results.71

63 While not the universally accepted standard, it is the most onerous and, therefore,
serves as the high-water mark for a constitutional analysis.
64 Holman, 532 F.3d at 290.
65 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (requiring courts to conform conditions with factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C)).
66 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134–35 (1992); see also Holman, 532 F.3d
at 290.
67 See Holman, 532 F. 3d at 290 (finding that “[t]he government’s interest in
protecting Holman from himself and protecting the general public from Holman are
essential or overriding interests sufficient to support an order requiring the involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs”).
68 Id. at 289.
69 For the factors that must be considered under statutory analysis, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1) (the history and characteristics of the defendant), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(D) (the aim of providing the defendant with “education or vocation
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”);
see also Sell factors, which require inquiry into the medical history of the offender. Sell
v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 184 (2003).
70 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
71 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
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Two potentially less intrusive means must be considered. First, a
district court could simply require an offender to take all prescribed
medications. Upon regular check-ins, a probation officer, in partnership
with a mental health professional, could assess the offender’s mood and
cognitive functions to determine if the offender appears compliant.
Perhaps the offender could also be required to produce receipts or other
documentation proving that he obtained his medications. If the
probation officer and mental health professional have reason to believe
the offender is not compliant, they could then order him to submit to a
urine analysis.72
While this alternative is unquestionably less intrusive, it is unlikely
to achieve substantially similar results as a requirement that an
offender take digital medication. Even if a urine analysis could deliver
proof positive regarding compliance, there is the concern that after
abruptly discontinuing medication an offender’s thoughts would
become too disordered to continue complying with other stated terms
of his supervised release, specifically attending check-in meetings with
his probation officer.73 Critically, for an involuntary medication order
to be necessary to further an important government interest it must be
predicated upon a finding that the offender has a history of refusing
medication.74 Thus, there are sufficient grounds to argue that this less
intrusive condition is “unlikely to achieve substantially the same
results.”75
The second potentially less intrusive alternative is that a district
court could impose a condition, similar to the one that was brought
before the Holman court, requiring the use of intramuscular injections
of an antipsychotic.76 Studies suggest that long-acting injectable
antipsychotics (LAIAs) have a number of advantages over their oral
counterparts.77 They were primarily developed to improve rates of
medication adherence and to “reduce the high rates of relapses and
rehospitalizations in schizophrenia due to treatment discontinuation.”78
72 See generally Joseph McEvoy et al., Quantitative Levels of Aripiprazole Parent Drug
and Metabolites in Urine, 231 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 23 (2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4221623/#!po=2.38095.
73 Miriam Larsen-Barr et al., Attempting to Discontinue Antipsychotic Medication:
Withdrawal Methods, Relapse and Success, 270 PSYCHIATRY RES. 365, 371 (2018)
(reporting that negative effects of medication withdrawal include “confusion,
disassociation, disorientation” and “difficulty with functioning”).
74 See United States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 286 (4th Cir. 2008).
75 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
76 Holman, 532 F.3d at 286.
77 Eduard Parellada & Miquel Bioque, Barriers to the Use of Long-Acting Injectable
Antipsychotics in the Management of Schizophrenia, 30 CNS DRUGS 689, 690 (2016).
78 Id.
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Despite these significant advantages, there are also drawbacks to
LAIAs. Because they are long-acting, it takes a greater period of time to
achieve steady levels in patients.79 Additionally, it is more difficult for a
physician to adjust the dosage level if she feels her patient is not
responding well to the medication.80 Finally, there are a number of
reasons why a patient might be averse to taking an LAIA, including pain
at the injection site, the burden of traveling to a clinic for administration
of the injections, and the perception of stigma.81
It is important to bear in mind that in Holman, Holman’s prison
psychiatrist recommended the use of LAIAs.82 Additionally, while in
prison, Holman received injections of risperidone, the same
antipsychotic specified in the condition of supervised release,83
indicating that his psychiatrist knew that he tolerated the medication
well. Ultimately, much of the decision around whether an LAIA is an
appropriate, less intrusive treatment will bear on the recommendation
of the treating physician.
Courts must also consider the patient’s preference with regard to
medication. Some patients prefer a monthly injection to remembering
to take a pill daily.84 This concern with missing pills is sure to be
compounded by the fact that missed dosages could result in a return to
prison.85 Moreover, some patients feel burdened psychologically by
their daily medication regimen, seeing it as a constant reminder of their
illness.86
Injections and digital medications are both intrusive in their own
ways. In considering which form of “intrusion” outweighs the other, it
is important to bear in mind that a term of supervised release does not
last indefinitely.87 Therefore, it is important to use this period of
supervision to develop good habits and to encourage a system that the
offender can continue on his own once the period of supervision has
ended. If the offender will have difficulty traveling to a clinic monthly to
79 Sofia Brissos et al., The Role of Long-Acting Injectable Antipsychotics in
Schizophrenia: A Critical Appraisal, 4 THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES IN PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 198,
201 (2014).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 United States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 286 (4th Cir. 2008).
83 Id.
84 Parellada & Bioque, supra note 77, at 693.
85 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (“[T]he court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release,
and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release
. . . if the court . . . finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated
a condition of supervised release. . . .”)
86 Parellada & Bioque, supra note 77, at 694.
87 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (authorized terms of supervised release).
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receive his injection or believes monthly injections are particularly
stigmatizing, then it makes little sense to compel him to adhere to a
treatment regime he will likely abandon once the term of supervised
release ends. The “least intrusive” condition, therefore, will consider
both the treating physician’s recommendation and the patient’s
preference.
Finally, the court must determine medical appropriateness by
looking at whether the condition is in the patient’s best medical
interest.88 Because symptoms of schizophrenia can include paranoia
and delusions, some mental health professionals fear that forcing
patients to use a system that will “monitor their behavior and send
signals out of their body” could exacerbate their conditions and be
detrimental to their prognoses.89 Thus, before any such condition could
be imposed on an offender, his psychiatrist must determine that he is an
appropriate candidate for digital medication. Additionally, probation
officers should make every effort to have a conversation with the
offender and his mental health professional to explain the capabilities of
the technology and the limited data that it can store and transmit.90
Knowing the system is not transmitting any sensitive medical data
should hopefully assuage some of the patient’s concerns.91
C. The Monitoring Component of the Digital Pill Also Passes
Constitutional Muster
As stated above, the digital pill is more than just an antipsychotic
medication, it also contains a monitoring component.92 Technologies
related to electronically monitoring individuals typically fall into two
categories—electronic location monitors and chemical substance
monitors.93 Courts routinely impose both types of electronic monitors
as a form of enhanced surveillance during probation or supervised
release.94

88

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).
Id.
90 See Caliendo & Hilas, supra note 4.
91 While information regarding the patient’s activity levels, heart rate, and body
temperature is automatically collected by the system, the patient can decline to share
this information with third parties. Terms & Conditions of Use and Patient Privacy Notice,
ABILIFY MYCITE 11, 14 (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.otsuka-us.com/media/static/AbilifyMycite-Patient-Terms-of-Use-and-Privacy-Notice.pdf.
92 Caliendo & Hilas, supra note 4.
93 Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1332 (2008).
94 Id.
89
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Electronic location monitors typically work by either setting
parameters for where an individual can or cannot go or by giving precise
information about an offender’s location that can either be reviewed
later or in real time.95 All fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the
federal government use electronic location monitors to track the
movements and activities of either pretrial defendants or offenders on
probation or supervised release.96 Many of the state provisions are
based on broad categories, such as the nature of the offense, rather than
on an “individualized determination of the dangerousness or likely
recidivism” of a particular offender.97
One of the most prevalently used chemical substance monitors is
SCRAM, the secure continuous remote alcohol monitor.98 Often imposed
as a condition for incorrigible drunk drivers, the monitor attaches to the
offender’s ankle and tests the alcohol concentration levels in the
person’s sweat on an hourly basis.99 It then date and time stamps the
data before storing it for transmission, typically to the offender’s
probation officer, via the offender’s home phone.100
Given the purpose and functionality of the SCRAM device—to
monitor the ingestion of certain substances and to transmit relevant
data regarding same to the offender’s probation officer via the
offender’s phone—it would appear that digital medication can be most
closely analogized to this type of monitoring device. This would suggest
that the monitoring component of the digital pill is on solid
constitutional footing. In Diehl v. Parole Bd.,101 for instance, Magistrate
Judge Joseph G. Scoville of the Western District of Michigan found the
SCRAM device to be “just another method to monitor a parolee’s alcohol
use, no different in kind from random urine testing.”102 Reasoning that
parolees have no Fourth Amendment right to be free from random drug
testing103—indeed, in the federal context, it is a required term of

95

Id. at 1332–33.
Stephanie Fahy et al., Use of Electronic Offender-Tracking Devices Expands Sharply,
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/issue-briefs/2016/09/use-of-electronic-offender-tracking-devices-expandssharply.
97 Murphy, supra note 93, at 1333.
98 Id. at 1334.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 No. 1:12-cv-402, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91059 (W.D. Mich. May 4, 2012), adopted,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90182 (W.D. Mich. June 29, 2012).
102 Id. at *7.
103 Id. at *7–8 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989)).
96
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supervised release104—Magistrate Judge Scoville found that the
imposition of SCRAM did not violate the offender’s Fourth Amendment
right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.105 Applying
the same reasoning to digital medication, because the same results
could be achieved through random urine testing, it would follow that the
monitoring component of the digital pill would not violate an offender’s
Fourth Amendment rights.106
Indeed, if a special condition requiring compliance with digital
medication were to survive the demanding strict scrutiny test that
governs challenges brought on substantive due process grounds, it is an
almost foregone conclusion that the condition would also survive a
challenge under the Fourth Amendment. In the Fourth Amendment
context, the state merely needs to show that the search was
“reasonable” after considering the individual’s right to privacy, on the
one hand, and the government’s legitimate interests, on the other.107
This highly deferential standard is rendered even more so in the context
of a condition of parole or probation. The Court has held that parolees
do not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.”108
A parolee’s expectation of privacy is even further diminished when he is
clearly informed of the condition of parole that infringes on his privacy
interest.109 Given this deferential standard, compounded with the wide
latitude district courts are afforded when crafting special conditions of
supervised release,110 it is not surprising that, while relatively common,
Fourth Amendment challenges to terms of supervised release are by and
large unsuccessful.111

104

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (a presumptive mandatory condition of supervised release is
that the offender submit to at least three periodic drug tests).
105 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
106 Additional challenges focus on whether SCRAM evidence is sufficiently reliable to
be admitted. See, e.g., People v. Dorcent, 909 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Kings Cty. Crim. Ct. Oct. 22,
2010). Evidentiary standards are beyond the scope of this Comment.
107 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006).
108 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
109 Id.
110 United States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 259–60 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing United States
v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999)); United States v. Bee, 162 F.3d 1232, 1234
(9th Cir. 1998) (stating that district courts have “broad discretion” when imposing
terms of supervised release, even when it comes to “restrictions that infringe on
fundamental rights”).
111 See Naomi M. Weinstein, The Legal Aspects of Conditional Release in the Criminal
and Civil Court System, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 666, 672 (2014).
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Certain instruments of monitoring, such as the electronic location
monitoring of sex offenders or registry statutes, are also commonly
challenged112 under the Ex Post Facto Clause.113 The Ex Post Facto
Clause bars application of a law “that changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime when
committed.”114 To prevail on an ex post facto claim, a defendant must
show (1) that the law operates retroactively, and (2) that the law works
to increase the penalty from what it was at the time he committed the
crime.115 More often than not, these challenges fail, as reviewing courts
have repeatedly held that even the most draconian civil statutes116 are
regulatory in nature—not punitive—and, therefore, not ex post facto
laws.117 To determine whether a law is regulatory or punitive, courts
first and foremost look to the intent of the legislature.118 If it is clear the
intent was to impose punishment, “that ends the inquiry.”119 If the
intention was to enact a “civil and nonpunitive” regulatory scheme,120
the courts will apply the multifactor test elucidated in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez121 to ensure that the purpose or effect of the
regulation is not so punitive as to overcome the deference extended to
the legislature.122 Key to this analysis is an inquiry into the principal
112 See John Kip Cornwell, Sex Offender Residency Restrictions: Government Regulation
of Public Health, Safety, and Morality, 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1, 16 (2015); see also
Murphy, supra note 93, at 1347.
113 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
114 Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 699 (2000) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
386, 390 (1798)).
115 Id.
116 This Comment does not address the use of digital medication outside the confines
of the formal criminal process. Accordingly, further exploration is needed regarding the
potential uses of digital medication in the civil preventative outpatient commitment
context. See generally John Kip Cornwell & Raymond Deeney, Exposing the Myths
Surrounding Preventative Outpatient Commitment for Individuals with Chronic Mental
Illness, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. (2003).
117 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (holding that the Alaska Sex
Offender Registration Act was designed to be a civil, nonpunitive way of identifying past
offenders for the purpose of protecting the public from the risk of recidivism); Belleau
v. Wall, F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding a Wisconsin law that imposed a condition
of lifetime electronic monitoring for sex offenders released from civil commitment to be
prevention and not punishment).
118 Smith, 538 U.S. at 93.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 372 U.S. 144, 165–66 (1963) (factors include whether the sanction “has
historically been regarded as a punishment;” whether its operation will further the
traditional aims of punishment, namely retribution and deterrence; “whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime;” and whether it appears to be excessive
in nature).
122 Smith, 538 U.S. at 93.
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aims of the condition of supervised release, as evidenced by the number
of courts that have consistently held that conditions of supervised
release should not be regarded as punishment if they “further the
deterrent, protective and rehabilitative goals of sentencing.”123
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks124 found that for
a law to be punitive it must further punitive goals: either “affix
culpability for prior criminal conduct” or deter future crime.125 While a
special condition requiring digital medication compliance does
potentially deter future crime, it also furthers nonpunitive goals, such as
ensuring proper mental health treatment and the safety of the offender
and the community at large.126 Given this precedent, it is probable that
a condition imposing digital medication would be regarded as
regulatory and, therefore, would not be an ex post facto law.
Assuming arguendo that a special condition of supervised release
requiring compliance with digital medication is punitive,127 such a
condition is subject to scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause. It is
unlikely that such a claim will succeed, however. First, the Court has
held that the Clause “looks to the standard of punishment prescribed by
a statute rather than to the sentence actually imposed.”128 While digital
medication introduces another mode of ensuring compliance with
antipsychotic medication, the standard that governs when a court could
impose such a condition remains unchanged. Additionally, courts have
held that there is no ex post facto prohibition on laws that change only
the procedures by which a case is adjudicated while leaving unchanged
the “substantive law of crimes.”129 A change in the methodology by
123 United States v. Jackson, 189 F.3d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v.
Eyler, 67 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d
377, 382 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 776 (7th Cir. 2006).
124 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
125 Id. at 362.
126 See Winston, 850 F.3d at 381–82 for the proposition that a finding that a condition
furthers goals of deterrence is not necessarily determinative that a law is punitive in
nature.
127 Certain factors support a finding that such a special condition would be punitive,
including: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 3583, the statute addressing terms of supervised release after
imprisonment, is codified in Title 18, Crime and Criminal Procedure, evincing a
legislative intent that the statute should be construed as penal in nature; and (2) courts
and commentators have discussed supervised release as being an integral part of the
penal sentencing scheme. See United States v. Larson, 402 Fed. Appx. 349, 354 (2010);
see also Byran R. Diederich, Risking Retroactive Punishment: Modifications of the
Supervised Release Statute and the Ex Post Facto Prohibition, 99 COLUM L. REV. 1551, 1554
(1999) (commenting that supervised release is an integral part of federal sentencing
scheme).
128 Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937).
129 Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45 (1990).
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which courts oversee medication compliance can be analogized to a
procedural alteration, rather than a substantive one. As stated above,
the “substance” of this additional form of punishment—if indeed, that is
what it is—namely, the statutory and constitutional constructs that
govern when a court can impose such a condition, remains unchanged.
Therefore, even if a special condition mandating use of digital
medication can be properly considered punitive, it does not offend the
Ex Post Facto Clause.
III. A CONDITION OF RELEASE MANDATING USE OF DIGITAL MEDICATION
REPRESENTS GOOD POLICY
As the previous Part showed, a district court must first make a
finding that an offender is a danger to himself or others before imposing
a condition of involuntary medication, whether it be digital medication
or otherwise.130 Thus, the requisite condition for any such term of
supervised release reflects what is perhaps the primary benefit of
compulsory medication—keeping people, both the offender and the
public at large, safe.
Separate and apart from ensuring the health and safety of the
offender and those individuals he comes into contact with, digital
medication could also be an important and effective tool to ameliorate
some of the intense strain placed on both our criminal justice and
mental health systems. The hope is that digital medication will help
ensure that offenders on supervised release remain stable, thereby
reducing the very high rates of recidivism among the mentally ill
offender population131 and hopefully preventing mental health crises
that divert critical resources away from a severely underserved
population.132

130

See supra Section II.A.
Matthew E. Hirschtritt & Renee L. Binder, Interrupting the Mental IllnessIncarceration-Recidivism Cycle, 317 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 695, 696 (Feb. 21, 2017) (noting
that the rate of recidivism for mentally ill offenders is nearly twice the national average;
53 percent for mentally ill offenders compared to 30 percent for offenders without a
history of mental illness); see also JENNIFER BRONSON & MARCUS BERZOFSKY, U.S. DEP’T. OF
JUSTICE, INDICATORS OF MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS REPORTED BY PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES,
2011–12, 7 (2017) (finding that prisoners with multiple arrests were more likely to have
a history of a mental health problem than prisoners with one arrest and that almost half
of those surveyed with a history of a mental health problem had been arrested 11 times
or more).
132 TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., EMPTYING THE ‘NEW ASYLUMS:’ A BEDS CAPACITY MODEL TO
REDUCE MENTAL ILLNESS BEHIND BARS 5–6 (Jan. 2017) [hereinafter EMPTYING THE NEW
ASYLUMS], https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/emptyingnew-asylums.pdf.
131
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A. Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder
Many Departments of Corrections, including the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (BOP), classify a wide spectrum of mental disorders as “serious
mental illnesses.”133 This Comment will focus on two specific diagnoses,
both of which are treated with the digital pill—schizophrenia and
bipolar disorder.134
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental illness characterized by
“delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech and behavior, and other
symptoms that cause social or occupational dysfunction.”135
Schizophrenia requires long-term treatment, which is usually
comprised of both antipsychotics and therapy.136 Similarly, bipolar
disorder is a chronic mental illness, typically treated with
medications.137 Those who suffer from bipolar disorder, also referred
to as manic-depressive illness, experience dramatic fluctuations in
mood and energy levels.138 Symptoms of bipolar disorder include
alternating periods of depression and “mania,” characterized by
increased activity, racing thoughts, and impulsive behavior.139
As noted supra, non-adherence to medication regimes is endemic
to the treatment of both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.140 “Non-

133

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS’ USE OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING FOR INMATES WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 5 n.18 (2017) (BOP
policy lists schizophrenia, bipolar and related disorders, and major depressive disorder
as diagnoses generally classified as serious mental illnesses. Other diagnoses such as
anxiety disorders, autism spectrum disorders, and personality disorders, to name but a
few, are additional diagnoses that can be classified as serious mental illness, particularly
if the condition is “sufficiently severe, persistent, and disabling”).
134 Bipolar disorder is a category that encompasses three related diagnoses—bipolar
I, bipolar II, and cyclothymic disorder. What Is Bipolar Disorder?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N
[hereinafter What is Bipolar Disorder?], https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/
bipolar-disorders/what-are-bipolar-disorders (last visited Apr. 3, 2021). The digital pill
is only indicated to treat bipolar I disorder, however, many of the statistics regarding
offenders with serious mental illness lump these diagnoses together referring to them,
collectively, as “bipolar disorder(s).” Therefore, it should be noted that only a segment
of this offender population could potentially be treated by the digital pill. See Product
Information, supra note 9.
135 DSM-5 Fact Sheet: Schizophrenia, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.
org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/educational-resources/dsm-5-fact-sheets (last visited
Sept. 19, 2019).
136 Xiang Cong Tham et al., Factors Affecting Medication Adherence Among Adults With
Schizophrenia: A Literature Review, 30 ARCHIVES OF PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 797, 797 (2016).
137 What Is Bipolar Disorder?, supra note 134.
138 Id.
139 Press Release, FDA, supra note 1.
140 Brown & Gray, supra note 12, at 192; see also Colom et al., supra note 12, at 24.
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adherence is the most powerful predictor of relapse,”141 which can have
profound ramifications, not only for the individual patient but for the
health care system as a whole. It is estimated that non-adherence to
medication costs approximately $100 billion per year, attributable to
the increased cost of treatment and hospitalization.142 Use of the digital
pill allows for transparency and accountability to help ensure that the
patient is regularly taking his medication. This is not only imperative to
treating the patient’s mental illness but is also beneficial to our strained
mental health care system.
B. Prisons and Jails as the “New Asylums” 143
The mid-twentieth century saw a movement toward the
deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill.144
Advancements in
psychotropic medications and psychotherapy shepherded in a dramatic
shift away from “warehousing” the mentally ill in hospitals and
institutions to treating them in comprehensive community mental
health centers.145 With the passage of the Mental Retardation Facilities
and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963,
community-based care became the standard of mental health
treatment.146 The Act provided for the construction of 2,000 community
health centers by 1980 and anticipated a growth rate of one center for
every increase of 100,000 to the population.147 As of 2017, there were
approximately 2,500 such community mental health centers.148
While the construction of community centers has not kept pace
with the growing need, the number of state hospital beds for the
mentally ill has sharply declined over the past sixty years.149 The dire
141 Brown & Gray, supra note 12, at 193; see also Tham et al., supra note 136, at 797
(citing the main reason for relapse in schizophrenics to be non-adherence to
antipsychotics).
142 See Belluck, supra note 14.
143 EMPTYING THE NEW ASYLUMS, supra note 132.
144 See, e.g., Deinstitutionalization, Mental Illness, and Medications: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Finance, 103rd Cong. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sen. Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance).
145 NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, https://www.thenationalcouncil.org/
about/national-mental-health-association/overview/community-mental-health-act
(last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
146 Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (1963).
147 Hearing, supra note 144, at 2 (statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance).
148 DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
ADMIN., NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES STUDY (N-MHSS): DATA ON MENTAL HEALTH
TREATMENT FACILITIES 36 (2017), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/
cbhsq-reports/2017_National_Mental_Health_Services_Survey.pdf.
149 EMPTYING THE NEW ASYLUMS, supra note 132, at 5.
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lack of space and resources means that “[i]n 44 states and the District of
Columbia, a prison or jail holds more individuals with serious mental
illness than the largest remaining state psychiatric hospital.”150 This
translates to almost 400,000 men and women, suffering from a mental
health condition, being held in U.S. jails and prisons.151 Put in the
context of the entire prison and jail population, approximately 37
percent of state and federal prisoners and 44 percent of jail inmates,
respectively, reported a history of a mental health problem.152 Of those
respective populations, 18 percent of prisoners and 25 percent of jail
inmates reported a history of bipolar disorder, and 9 percent of
prisoners and 12 percent of jail inmates reported a history of
schizophrenia or another psychotic disorder.153 When compared to the
paltry percentages of the U.S. general population who have received
these diagnoses—2.8 percent for bipolar disorder and 0.25-0.64
percent for schizophrenia154—it is evident that persons suffering from
these serious mental health diagnoses are severely overrepresented in
our nation’s jails and prisons. The staggering rate of incarceration in the
mentally ill community is exacerbated by the very high rates of
recidivism that characterize this population.155 The digital pill can help
stem the tide of recidivism, and thereby reduce rates of incarceration,
by providing a mechanism to help ensure that mentally ill offenders
remain stable on their medication.
C. Improving Mental Health Outcomes for Mentally Ill Offenders
Will Help Close the Revolving Door of Prisons
The mentally ill are particularly susceptible to the physical,
emotional, and psychological stresses of incarceration, which lead them
to further decompensate.156 The stresses of institutional life can
manifest in myriad ways, including violence. A 2017 special report from
150 TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., GOING, GOING, GONE: TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
ELIMINATING STATE PSYCHIATRIC BEDS 9 (June 2016), https://www.treatmentadvocacy
center.org/storage/documents/going-going-gone.pdf.
151 EMPTYING THE NEW ASYLUMS, supra note 132, at 1.
152 BRONSON & BERZOFSKY, supra note 131, at 1.
153 Id. at 3.
154 Mental Health Information: Statistics (Schizophrenia), NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL
HEALTH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/schizophrenia.shtml#part_1548
80 (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); Mental Health Information: Statistics (Bipolar Disorder),
NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/bipolardisorder.shtml#part_155460 (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).
155 See Hirschritt & Binder, supra note 131, at 696.
156 See Fellner, supra note 19, at 391 (2006); see also Jailing People with Mental Illness,
NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/learn-more/public-policy/jailingpeople-with-mental-illness (last visited Oct. 25, 2019).
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the U.S. Department of Justice stated that prisoners and jail inmates with
a history of severe mental illness were more likely to have been charged
with assault compared to prisoners and inmates with no such history.157
A strong argument could be made that at least some of this violence is
preemptive, as the mentally ill all too often find themselves the targets
of both sexual and physical violence.158 Sadly, but perhaps not
surprising given these realities of life behind bars, prisoners with
mental illness are more likely to attempt or complete suicide, which is
the leading cause of death in U.S. jails.159
Additionally, the disorganized thought processes and poor impulse
control that characterize schizophrenia and bipolar disorder also make
it difficult for mentally ill prisoners to conform their behavior to the
strict requirements of institutionalized life.160 Consequently, mentally
ill prisoners are more likely to receive disciplinary infractions while in
prison.161 And it is not just the symptoms of mental illness that make
incarceration particularly hard on these prisoners, but also the rigid and
punitive characteristics of incarceration itself, which are inherently at
odds with the mental health needs of this population.162
Perhaps most troubling, all of these factors that characterize a
mentally ill offender’s experience in prison—the increased likelihood of
victimization, the difficulty in adhering to the rigidity of incarceration,
and concerns that the offender may be a risk to himself or others—are
also all reasons why offenders find themselves in solitary
confinement.163 Solitary confinement is shown to have devasting

157

BRONSON & BERZOFSKY, supra note 131, at 9.
Marshall T. Bewley & Robert D. Morgan, A National Survey of Mental Health
Services Available to Offenders with Mental Illness: Who is Doing What? 35 LAW HUM.
BEHAV. 351, 352 (2011).
159 EMPTYING THE NEW ASYLUMS, supra note 132, at 1.
160 Kenneth Adams & Joseph Ferrandino, Managing Mentally Ill Inmates in Prison, 35
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 913, 917 (2008).
161 Bewley & Morgan, supra note 158, at 352.
162 Fellner, supra note 19, at 391 (noting that it is “nearly impossible” to coordinate
the needs of the mentally ill with rules and goals reflecting “staff concerns about
security, safety, power, and control”); see also Adams & Ferrandino, supra note 160,
at 914 (quoting a report from the Oregon Department of Corrections acknowledging
that “finding safe, humane, and non-punitive methods for handling inmates who are
experiencing the symptoms of mental illness is an ongoing challenge for prison
administrators”).
163 See Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal and Public Safety
Consequences: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human
Rights of S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 712 (2012) (statement of Michael
Jacobson, President & Director, Vera Institute of Justice) (noting that solitary
confinement is most commonly used in the United States: (1) “to punish prisoners for
rule violations;” (2) to isolate those prisoners believed to be a risk to the safety of others
158
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consequences for a person’s mental health.164 BOP’s policy “recognizes
that an inmate’s mental health may deteriorate during restrictive
housing placement.”165 Symptoms such as social anxiety, depression, a
decline in cognitive abilities, and instances of self-harm and suicide,
have been exhibited by even those prisoners who entered solitary
without a diagnosis of mental illness.166
The psychological harm endemic to solitary confinement is why, in
2011, the U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council issued
an interim report stating that imposition of solitary confinement on
persons with mental disabilities constitutes “cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment,” which violates the Convention against Torture.167
Despite those recommendations, a 2017 investigation of federal
prisoners conducted by the Office of the Inspector General found that
even though the BOP’s official policy denounces solitary confinement,
prisoners, including those with mental illness, were housed in single
cells for extended periods with very little human contact.168 And the
problem of the mentally ill being held in solitary confinement is not
unique to the federal penal system; similar observations have been
noted in state systems as well.169
The mental decompensation that is an almost inevitable byproduct
of solitary confinement is deeply disconcerting, not only for the health
of the individuals who must endure such conditions but for the safety
and security of the community at large. Particularly problematic are
reports that inmates with mental illness are released directly from
solitary confinement into the community, some of whom have spent

or to the security of the institution; and (3) to protect those thought to be at risk from
other members of the general population).
164 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 133, at 1.
165 Id. (citing BOP Program Statement 5310.16, Treatment and Care of Inmates with
Mental Illness (May 1, 2014)). Restrictive housing, often a euphemism for solitary
confinement, consists of the placement in a locked room or cell for twenty-two hours or
more a day; however, under the U.S. Department of Justice’s definition of restrictive
housing, it could include being housed under such conditions with another inmate. Id.
166 Sarah Childress, Craig Haney: Solitary Confinement is a “Tried-and-True” Torture
Device, FRONTLINE, PBS (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/
craig-haney-solitary-confinement-is-a-tried-and-true-torture-device.
167 Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur), Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of
the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 21, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011), http://solitary
confinement.org/uploads/SpecRapTortureAug2011.pdf.
168 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 133, at i.
169 See Childress, supra note 166 (commenting on being “taken aback” by the number
of seemingly mental ill offenders housed in solitary confinement in Pelican Bay State
Prison in California during the early 1990s).
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years in isolation.170 Both experts and prison officials maintain that
failing to re-socialize inmates before release into the community is
troubling,171 and can have disastrous consequences.172
All of these are reasons why the criminal justice system should
utilize innovative tools, such as the digital pill, to ensure that mentally
ill offenders are receiving proper treatment once released and help stem
the likelihood of recidivism.173
D. Reducing Recidivism Improves Prison Conditions for All174
There are approximately 2.2 million people incarcerated in our
nation’s jails and prisons, which equates to a 500 percent increase over
the last forty years.175 Concurrent with this increase in the overall
population, the number of people with serious mental illness entering
the criminal justice system has also increased exponentially.176
Some jurisdictions have tried to mitigate this disturbing trend by
instituting mental health courts to provide more specialized attention
to this vulnerable population.177 While the number of mental health
courts has been slowly increasing over the past twenty years, and
170

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 133, at 27.
Id.; see also Childress, supra note 166.
172 See Rick Raemisch, Why We Ended Long-Term Solitary Confinement in Colorado,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/opinion/solitaryconfinement-colorado-prison.html (remembering Tom Clements, the former executive
director of the Colorado Department of Corrections who, in 2013, was assassinated by a
former prisoner who had been released directly into the community after spending
seven years in solitary confinement).
173 This Comment does not suggest that digital medication should curtail the
important work being done to restrict the use of solitary confinement. Rather, it
recognizes that while this uphill battle ensues, the criminal justice system should
explore all alternatives to reduce the numbers of mentally ill people in our prisons and
jails and, in turn, solitary confinement.
174 The author would like to reiterate that nothing in this Comment proposes that
digital medication is a quick fix for the myriad shortcomings of our criminal justice and
mental health systems. There is no question that comprehensive reform is needed to
reduce our staggering prison population, particularly with regard to diverting
vulnerable populations, like those suffering from mental illness and substance abuse
disorders, away from the criminal justice system and into programs that provide them
with holistic care. This Comment merely suggests that the digital pill may help a small
segment of offenders who may benefit from closer supervision while adjusting to life in
an non-institutional setting.
175 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS, https://www.
sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf
(last updated Oct. 2020).
176 See Fellner, supra note 19, at 392–94.
177 Desmond Loong et al., The Effectiveness of Mental Health Courts in Reducing
Recidivism and Police Contact: A Systematic Review, COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. (June
2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10597-019-00421-9.
171
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although recent data suggests that these courts help reduce rates of
recidivism and improve offender outcomes,178 state and federal
correctional systems remain overwhelmed with staggering numbers of
mentally ill inmates.179 While mentally ill prisoners are omnipresent
throughout both state and federal correctional institutions, a recent
study suggests that only twenty percent of mentally ill offenders
reported receiving any mental health treatment while incarcerated.180
In 2014, BOP attempted to address the failings of the federal
system to provide mental health treatment, issuing a new policy that
provided for more comprehensive care and treatment for mentally ill
offenders.181 This well-intentioned and much-needed policy, however,
may have had a perverse effect. A 2017 report from the Office of the
Inspector General found that BOP had not provided sufficient resources
to implement their new policy and, consequently, mental health staff at
federal prisons may have deliberately reduced the number of prisoners
classified as seriously mentally ill to alleviate some of this additional
workload.182 The report went on to find that, even when prisoners were
properly classified, mental health staff shortages resulted in some
inmates with mental illness not receiving adequate care.183
Not only is this extremely troubling for the individual patients who
are not getting the care they need, but this failure to provide proper
treatment could have ramifications for the prison system as a whole. In
the seminal case, Estelle v. Gamble, the Court held that “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes . . .
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” prohibited by the Eighth

178

Id.
See Adams & Ferrandino, supra note 160, at 913; see also Fellner, supra note 19,
at 394.
180 Jane C. Daquin & Leah E. Daigle, Mental Disorder and Victimisation in Prison:
Examining the Role of Mental Health Treatment, 28 CRIM. BEHAV. AND MENTAL HEALTH 141,
149 (2018).
181 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 133, at 37.
182 Id. (finding that while the number of inmates requiring some level of mental
health care remained relatively stagnant over the course of four years, the number of
inmates classified as needing such care decreased approximately thirty percent in the
year after the new policy was issued).
183 Id. at 37, 41 (quoting interview with BOP Chief Psychologist where he admitted
that mental health staff shortages resulted in people “reducing care levels in order to
survive”); see also Christie Thompson & Taylor Elizabeth Eldridge, Treatment Denied:
The Mental Health Crisis in Federal Prisons, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 21, 2018),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/11/21/treatment-denied-the-mentalhealth-crisis-in-federal-prisons (statement from BOP psychologist that psychologists
were often required to man gun towers or perform prisoner escorts, lamenting, “[w]e’re
not really devoted to treating”).
179
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Amendment.184 Subsequent circuit court decisions have held that when
analyzing whether the level of care meets constitutional standards,
there is to be no distinction drawn between physical and mental health
care.185 Additionally, federal courts have held that maintaining mental
health staff in “sufficient numbers to identify and treat in an
individualized manner those treatable inmates suffering from serious
mental disorders” is essential to constitutionally adequate mental
health care.186
In Coleman v. Wilson, the Eastern District of California found that
the California Department of Corrections’ “significant” and “chronic”
understaffing of its mental health care services violated the Eighth
Amendment.187 This chronic understaffing was only one of the myriad
constitutional violations that led to the appointment of a Special Master
to oversee the implementation of remedial measures designed to cure
these violations.188 “In 2007, 12 years after his appointment, the Special
Master in Coleman” issued a report detailing the “deteriorating” state of
mental health care in California’s prison system, ascribing this decline
to the severe overcrowding in the prison system.189 Confronted with a
similar scathing report from the Receiver in Plata v. Brown, a related
case concerning the condition of medical care in California prisons, the
Coleman and Plata plaintiffs moved their respective district courts to
convene a three-judge panel to order the California Department of
Corrections to reduce the state’s prison population.190 The three-judge
panel, under power of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, ordered
California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity,
a reduction which equated to approximately 38,000 to 46,000 prisoners
within two years.191 On appeal, the Court, while recognizing that the
potential release of such a large number of prisoners “is a matter of
undoubted, grave concern,”192 upheld the panel’s order, finding that the
“mental health care provided by California’s prisons falls below the
184 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976)).
185 See Doty v. Cty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994); Torraco v. Maloney,
923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir. 1990);
Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1990); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47
(4th Cir. 1977).
186 Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 595 F. Supp. 1558, 1577 (D. Idaho 1984) (citing
Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980)).
187 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1307–08 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
188 Id. at 1324.
189 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 507 (2011).
190 Id. at 509.
191 Id. at 509–10.
192 Id. at 501.
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standard of decency that inheres in the Eighth Amendment. This
extensive and ongoing constitutional violation requires a remedy, and a
remedy will not be achieved without a reduction in overcrowding.”193
As the Court’s order in Plata makes clear, constitutional levels of
care are irreconcilable with overcrowded correctional institutions.194
Thus, reducing rates of recidivism, particularly among offenders with
serious mental illness who require additional care and services, helps
ensure that all prisoners and jail inmates receive a constitutional level
of care.
E. Ensuring Medication Adherence Helps Alleviate the Strain Placed
on Mental Health System
In many states, detainees deemed incompetent to stand trial can
remain hospitalized “even though they are not ill enough to qualify for
involuntary hospitalization under civil commitment laws.”195 Given the
grossly inadequate number of mental health beds in state hospitals, this
often leaves more critically ill members of the community out on the
streets.196
Digital medication addresses this problem by identifying nonadherence early, before an offender can decompensate to the point
where he may need to be hospitalized to restore competency.197 Take,
for example, the offender in Holman.198 When he was first released from
prison, the conditions of his supervised release contained no
requirement that he receive mental health treatment or take all
prescribed medications.199 It was only upon recommendation of his
probation officer that the conditions were modified to contain such
requirements; however, by then, it was too late.200 Holman had left his
home, leaving his medication behind.201 He was found several weeks
later, “wandering aimlessly and in a partially catatonic state.”202 It took

193

Id. at 545.
Id. at 502 (stating that “overcrowding is the ‘primary cause’ . . . [of] the severe and
unlawful mistreatment of prisoners through grossly inadequate provision of medical
and mental health care”).
195 EMPTYING THE NEW ASYLUMS, supra note 132, at 17.
196 See id.
197 See Larsen-Barr et al., supra note 73, at 372 (studies evidence that withdrawal
from antipsychotic medications can be severe enough to require hospitalization).
198 532 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2008).
199 Holman, 532 F.3d at 286.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
194
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several months before he was stabilized and deemed competent to
stand trial for violating the terms of his supervised release.203
While the opinion in Holman is silent as to where he was held while
his competency was restored, it is reasonable to assume that it was in a
hospital. Thus, if digital medication had identified his non-adherence
earlier, before he decompensated to the point of hospitalization, a
member of the community could have used this mental health bed. This
is especially poignant when one considers the unknown number of
patients who are turned away from hospital care, unable to get the
medical treatment they so desperately need, who then go on to commit
crime, “typically misdemeanors and nuisance offenses,”204 thus
perpetuating the cycle of incarceration, decompensation, and
recidivism.
F. Potential Counterarguments
Opponents of digital medication might argue that such technology
could actually increase rates of recidivism by imposing yet another
condition that offenders would have to comply with upon penalty of
revocation of their term of supervised release.205 There is some
evidence that suggests mentally ill offenders are returned to prison
more often for technical violations of parole than for committing a new
crime.206
Moreover, the nature of mental illness, particularly
schizophrenia, can make compliance with conditions of supervised
release more difficult.207 The concern is that a condition mandating
digital medication would be setting mentally ill offenders up for failure
and effectively criminalizing their mental illness.
Compounding this concern of an overly rigid condition that does
not account for the compliance challenges inherent to mental illness is
the reality that the technology itself is not perfect. It is possible that a

203

Id.
EMPTYING THE NEW ASYLUMS, supra note 132, at 6.
205 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (“[T]he court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release,
and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release
. . . if the court . . . finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated
a condition of supervised release. . . .”).
206 Jennifer Eno Louden et al., How Do Probation Officers Assess and Manage
Recidivism and Violence Risk for Probationers With Mental Disorder? An Experimental
Investigation, 37 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 22, 22–23 (2013).
207 Tham et al., supra note 136, at 807 (noting that “[p]sychotic symptoms have been
linked to declining memory and executive function[,] . . . [t]herefore, those with severe
symptoms cannot make appropriate decisions to take medications, leading to
medication non-adherence”).
204
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taken dose might not be reflected in the transmitted data.208 For these
reasons, it is apparent that this condition cannot be absolute. One
missed pill cannot be a reason to revoke an offender’s supervised
release.209 Several missed pills in a week would be a red flag to have an
intervention with the probation officer and a mental health professional
to prevent further non-adherence. Only after a subsequent pattern of
missed dosages after such a meeting would a probation officer be
warranted in revoking the offender’s supervised release. Just because
the realities of the illness and the technology demand flexibility does not
suggest that digital medication is without value. Research indicates that
parole supervision decreases the likelihood that mentally ill offenders
will recidivate.210 Moreover, there is evidence that adherence behavior
engenders a healthy and proactive attitude toward preventing relapse
and “enjoy[ing] the advantages of being adherent,” which in turn fosters
adherence in the future.211 Thus, a condition imposing digital
medication could reduce recidivism through increased supervision and
improved medication adherence, even after the term of supervised
release expires.
Another argument against the imposition of digital medication is
that medication alone will not keep the seriously mentally ill from
recidivating because the question of why the mentally ill recidivate at
rates that far exceed their non-mentally ill counterparts212 is far more
nuanced. Studies suggest that a confluence of factors contribute to high
rates of recidivism, including high rates of substance abuse, 213
208

Product Information, ABILIFY MYCITE, https://www.abilifymycite.com/about (last
visited Jan. 9, 2020).
209 Given the limitations of the technology, not only would such a stringent condition
be inherently unfair, it would also be unlikely to meet due process protections that
attach to supervised release revocation. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980); see
also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) (noting that both the parolee and
society have “an interest in not having parole revoked because of erroneous
information”).
210 Jason Matejkowski & Michael Ostermann, Serious Mental Illness, Criminal Risk,
Parole Supervision, and Recidivism: Testing of Conditional Effects, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
75, 77 (2015).
211 Tham et al., supra note 136, at 807.
212 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-182, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES,
FEDERAL PRISONS: INFORMATION ON INMATES WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS AND STRATEGIES TO
REDUCE RECIDIVISM, 2 (2018).
213 Samantha Hoke, Mental Illness and Prisoners: Concerns for Communities and
Healthcare Providers, 20 ONLINE J. OF ISSUES IN NURSING (Jan. 2015), http://ojin.nursing
world.org/MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/ANAPeriodicals/OJIN/TableofCont
ents/Vol-20-2015/No1-Jan-2015/Mental-Illness-and-Prisoners.html; see also KiDeuk
Kim et al., The Processing and Treatment of Mentally Ill Persons in the Criminal Justice
System (Mar. 2015), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/48981/
2000173-The-Processing-and-Treatment-of-Mentally-Ill-Persons-in-the-Criminal-
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unemployment,214 homelessness,215 and a lack of access to mental health
services.216
The federal and various state governments have enacted
legislation aimed at reducing rates of recidivism by targeting these
sociological and criminogenic risks.217 Other federal and state programs
are aimed at providing mentally ill offenders with employment
opportunities, educational opportunities, and substance abuse
treatment—all of which have proved to be successful in reducing
recidivism rates.218
A term of supervised release that mandates digital medication
should not be viewed as supplanting these programs but rather as an
integral complement to them. Stabilizing a patient on medication is an
important precursor to psychotherapy, vocational training, or
substance abuse treatment.219 In particular, there is a high correlation
between mental illness and substance abuse.220 Moreover, research
shows that offenders with both mental illness and a history of substance
abuse are more likely to recidivate than those with serious mental
illness alone.221 Evidence suggests that the high rates of substance
abuse among the mentally ill can be attributed to a desire to treat, or at
least lessen, the symptoms of mental illness.222 Thus it follows that

Justice-System.pdf (stating that nearly three-quarters of state prisoners with a history
of mental health problems reported a co-occurring substance dependence).
214 See Hoke, supra note 213.
215 Hirschritt & Binder, supra note 131, at 695 (lifetime arrest rates of homeless
individuals with serious mental illness at a staggering rate of 62.9 to 90 percent).
216 EMPTYING THE NEW ASYLUMS, supra note 132, at 15.
217 See Hirschritt & Binder, supra note 131, at 696 (discussing bills passed in
Montana, Nevada, and Virginia in 2013 which provide funding to support communitybased organizations that provide substance abuse services, employment and housing
resources, and medical care to ex-offenders with serious mental illness); see also 21st
Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033, § 14022(l)(2)(c)(i) (Dec. 13,
2016) (permitting the Attorney General to award grant monies to applicants for the
development of “post-release transition plans for eligible inmates that, in a
comprehensive manner, coordinate health, housing, medical, employment, and other
appropriate services and public benefits”).
218 Hoke, supra note 213.
219 Glenn D. Walters & Gregory Crawford, Major Mental Illness and Violence History as
Predictors of Institutional Misconduct and Recidivism: Main and Interaction Effects, 38
LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 238, 245 (2013) (Psychotropic “[m]edication should . . . be
supplemented by a multidimensional approach designed to address the manifold mental
health- and criminal justice-related problems experienced by [seriously mentally ill]
offenders”).
220 James A. Wilson & Peter B. Wood, Dissecting the Relationship Between Mental
Illness and Return to Incarceration, 42 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 527, 528 (2014).
221 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 212, at 2.
222 Hoke, supra note 213.
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focusing on medication adherence would abate one of the key drivers of
substance abuse and, therefore, recidivism, which is the desire to obtain
relief from one’s symptoms through self-medication.
Another potential counterargument is the cost of digital
medication, which opponents would suggest is prohibitive.223 In
addition to the cost of the drug itself, users will also need access to a
Bluetooth-enabled device for the monitoring system to function.224
While there is no question that the digital pill is a more expensive
alternative, certainly more than generic antipsychotics, there are
several reasons why this factor alone does not defeat an argument that
digital medication should be considered a useful tool for the right
patient. First, courts would only mandate digital medication for those
patients for whom a traditional oral antipsychotic would not be a viable
alternative because of a history of non-adherence.225 Thus, the
appropriate comparison would be between digital medication and
LAIAs. When comparing these alternatives, the price differential is less
stark.226 And after factoring in the additional administrative costs, this
price differential becomes even more negligible.227 It should also be
noted that digital medication is in its infancy.228 Venture capitalists have
been pouring a tremendous amount of money into new digital
technologies,229 suggesting that competitive products are likely to enter
the market and drive the price down.230
Additionally, there is some question as to which party would
shoulder this cost—the criminal justice system or the individual
offender. Most likely it would be the individual, who will then be left to
223 Zoë LaRock, Smart Pills Aren’t Living up to the Hype Yet—But They’re Not Doomed,
BUS INSIDER, https://www.businessinsider.com/abilify-mycite-smart-pill-lacksevidence-of-benefits-2019-7 (July 23, 2019) (digital medication is currently priced at
$1,650, while the generic alternative costs $20).
224 Caliendo & Hilas, supra note 4.
225 See supra Section II.B.
226 See CAN. AGENCY FOR DRUGS AND TECH. IN HEALTH, ARIPIPRAZOLE PROLONGED RELEASE
SUSPENSION FOR INJECTION, (Abilify Maintena) (300 mg and 400 mg Vial) tbl.1, NAT’L CTR. FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (Feb. 2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK447758/
table/pe1.t1/ (manufacturer’s submitted price of vial of long-acting atypical
antipsychotic ranges from $78 to $635).
227 See Parellada & Bioque, supra note 77, at 694 (patients often cite loss of time spent
on travel to the clinic for monthly injections and high direct and indirect costs as
significant drawbacks to LAIAs).
228 See Press Release, FDA, supra note 1.
229 Belluck, supra note 14.
230 Despite Proteus’s June 2020 bankruptcy filing, analysts remain enthusiastic about
the future of this technology. See THE MED. FUTURIST, The Present and Future of Digital
Pills (July 21, 2020), https://medicalfuturist.com/the-present-and-future-of-digitalpills.
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navigate the murky waters of how his private health insurance or
Medicaid process requests for court-ordered treatment.231 For this
reason, it is essential that, prior to release, prison officials aid the
offender in enrolling for Medicaid benefits, a service that many
correctional systems have already recognized the value of.232 It should
also be noted that if a patient is successful in getting Medicaid coverage
for the digital pill, he may also qualify for a loan of a limited-functionality
smartphone, necessary to receive and transmit the adherence data.233
Alternatively, digital medication could be analogized to electronic
monitoring services, which many states assume the cost of when it
comes to indigent defendants.234 When considering the question of cost
from the perspective of a state-payer system, one must compare the cost
of digital medication to the cost of incarcerating seriously mentally ill
offenders. Studies suggest that state prisons spend upwards of $5
billion annually to incarcerate non-violent mentally ill offenders.235
Specifically, research indicates “[t]he economic impact of recidivism and
psychiatric relapse among patients with schizophrenia is substantial
from a state government perspective.”236 Viewed in light of the
alternatives, the cost of digital medication becomes more palatable.
Finally, it should be noted that the high cost associated with digital
medication could actually be a good thing. A primary critique of
monitoring technologies is that the “economics of technological control
231

See MARSHA REGENSTEIN & LEA NOLAN, GEO. WASH. UNIV. DEP’T HEALTH POLICY,
IMPLICATIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S MEDICAID EXPANSION ON LOW-INCOME INDIVIDUALS
ON PROBATION (Feb. 2014), https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1296&context=sphhs_policy_facpubs (The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services has deferred from issuing a ruling as to whether state Medicaid programs must
cover court-ordered treatments. Absent guidance from the federal government, states
are free to either include them among covered benefits or exclude them wholly from
coverage.).
232 See Kim et al., supra note 213, at 34 (research indicates that enrolling seriously
mentally ill offenders in Medicaid at the time of release from jail has proven to be an
effective policy and one that has become common practice across a number of
jurisdictions).
233 See Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Office of Inspector Gen., OIG Advisory
Opinion No. 19-02 (Jan. 29, 2019).
234 Deeanna M. Button et al., Using Electronic Monitoring to Supervise Sex Offenders:
Legislative Patterns and Implications for Community Corrections Officers, 20 CRIM. JUST.
POL’Y REV. 414, 427 (2009).
235 Wilson & Wood, supra note 220, at 528.
236 I. Lin et al., General Model for Estimating Medical and Criminal Justice Costs Among
Patients with Schizophrenia After Release From Jail/Prison, 17 VALUE IN HEALTH A218
(2014), https://www.valueinhealthjournal.com/article/S1098-3015(14)01326-6/pdf
(estimating that a 20 percent increase in the proportion of ex-offenders treated with
antipsychotics following release decreased total cumulative costs to the state of Florida
by almost $600 per patient over three years).
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enable the regulation of greater numbers of persons under less
stringent conditions for a longer period of time and to a greater degree
than an equivalent physical intrusion.”237 Therefore, the higher costs
associated with digital medication serve as added insurance that this
condition will be reserved only for those offenders for which there are
not less intrusive, and less expensive, alternatives.
IV. POTENTIAL EXPANSION OF DIGITAL MEDICATION
There are two primary areas where this technology could have
useful implications and, therefore, should be explored further. The first
is in the realm of probation. Similar to terms of supervised release, a
district court may attach discretionary conditions to a sentence of
probation.238 As in the context of conditions of supervised release, the
court is authorized to impose a condition that an offender undergoes
“available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment.”239 This
determination must further the same statutory factors that govern
conditional terms of supervised release.240
Additionally, such
conditions must “involve only such deprivations of liberty or property
as are reasonably necessary” to further such ends.241 Therefore, a court
would analyze a condition of digital medication using many of the same
factors in the probation context as it would in the context of supervised
release.
There are key distinctions, however. First, if a court attaches the
condition to the sentence without the consent of the offender, the
prosecution may have difficulty proving the requisite history of nonadherence to overcome an argument that a less intrusive alternative,
namely a condition requiring the offender to take an oral antipsychotic
as prescribed, is unlikely to achieve the same result.242 Alternatively, if
the defendant voluntarily consents to the condition as part of a plea
agreement, there will be a question of whether the defendant’s consent
is valid or was coerced.243 Voluntariness is predicated upon the “plea of
guilty [being] entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences . . .
237

Murphy, supra note 93, at 1367–68.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b).
239 Id. § 3563(b)(9).
240 Id. § 3563(b); § 3553(a)(1)–(2) (“the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant” and considerations of punishment,
deterrence, rehabilitation, and the need “to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant”).
241 Id. § 3563(b).
242 See supra Section II.B.
243 Richard J. Bonnie, Judicially Mandated Treatment with Naltrexone for OpiateAddicted Criminal Offenders, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 64, 81 (2005).
238
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of any commitments made to him by the court.”244 Therefore, depending
on the defendant’s mental health at the time of prosecution, it may not
be possible for him to voluntarily consent to such a condition. If such
voluntariness can be established, such a condition would greatly further
the goals of preventing further mental decompensation while
incarcerated and alleviating the strain placed on the criminal justice
system through overcrowding.245
The second area where the criminal justice system could
potentially leverage this technology is the treatment of those struggling
with opioid addiction. An ingestible sensor could be embedded in a
naltrexone tablet. Naltrexone blocks specific receptors for opiate drugs,
thereby preventing these narcotics from producing a high in users.246
The potential advantages of such a drug are self-evident; whether a
district court could impose such a condition of either supervised release
or probation is less clear. It is unlikely that the prosecution could make
a sufficient showing of medical necessity, especially when there are
much less intrusive alternatives, such as substance abuse treatment
programs. But, applying the Harper-Riggins-Sell framework, it is not
inconceivable that—presented with a defendant who had repeatedly
failed to comply with treatment programs and who had previously
overdosed or had a history of committing violent acts while under the
influence of opioids—a district court may mandate involuntary
medication of digital naltrexone.
In the probation context, when such a condition is being attached
to a plea agreement, it is more likely that a condition mandating digital
naltrexone would be upheld. As long as the defendant was fully aware
of the consequence of his commitment and his promise was not induced
by “threats,” “misrepresentation,” or by “promises that are by their
nature improper,” the district court is likely to find such a condition
voluntary and, therefore, enforceable.247
V. CONCLUSION
The mid-twentieth century witnessed a profound shift in the way
mental illness was viewed and treated in the United States. With the
most benevolent of intentions, this movement away from
institutionalization had an insidious effect—the mass incarceration of
244 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en
banc), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)).
245 See supra Sections III.A–B.
246 See Bonnie, supra note 243, at 67.
247 Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton, 246 F.2d at 572 n.2).
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those with serious mental illness. A swelling population of prisoners
with serious mental health needs not only jeopardizes the physical and
mental health of the offenders at issue but also compromises the ability
of the criminal justice system to deliver a constitutional level of care to
all offenders. Reducing rates of recidivism among mentally ill offenders
is an important step in alleviating the pressures placed on our criminal
justice system, and digital medication, in conjunction with other terms
of supervised release aimed at addressing the myriad sociological and
criminological factors that contribute to recidivism, may well be a useful
tool to achieve this end.

